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Dead Letters? The Uniform Civil Code through the Eyes 





The question of whether a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) for the whole 
Indian territory should replace the existing religious personal law 
system, which India, like other post-colonial states, maintains, has 
acted as a catalyst for discourses on national integration, modernity, 
secularism and more recently, gender equality. From an equality point 
of view the pluralistic personal law system is perceived as problematic, 
as firstly, it provides for different laws for members of different reli-
gious communities and secondly, it treats men differently from women. 
Here, the introduction of a secular Uniform Civil Code could provide for 
a solution. On the other hand, the global trend among academics as 
well as International Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations 
and human rights activists seems to be one that moves away from the 
"state-centred orthodoxy of rule of law" towards the acceptance of 
"normative orderings beyond the state's reach" (Sezgin 2010b: 1, 2). 
This paradigm shift acknowledges that "[a]bout 80 % of the people in 
the developing world, particularly in Asia and Africa, are believed to be 
using informal or non-state legal systems" (Sezgin 2010a: 5).  
If legal pluralism is accepted as a fact, then the idea of article 44 of 
the Indian Constitution, a Directive Principle of State Policy that urges 
the state to introduce a UCC, seems somewhat out of place. Has this 
constitutional goal of a uniform set of laws therefore lost its meaning? 
This question is assessed here through an analysis of the discourse 
around article 44 among two different entities: the Indian women’s 
movement and the Indian Supreme Court. Both actors play a central 
role within the state—the court as one of the "classical" three powers, 






























influences the socio-political dynamics of a democracy. Both entities 
are believed to be avant-garde and activist. Both strive to fulfil a vision 
of a rights expansion for vulnerable groups.  
To be sure, "the Indian women’s movement" is not a homogenous 
bloc with only one standpoint; rather it is heterogeneous, consisting of 
a variety of sub-groups along the lines of identities other than gender. 
The question of who can and should represent whom regarding 
"women’s concerns" is a central one and it is clear that the notion of 
"women" as a category carries its own problems (Krishnaraj 1998: 
393). Nevertheless, broader trends and positions with regard to the 
personal laws and the UCC can indeed be identified when looking at 
different women’s groups and activists over a time span of about four 
decades. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper it seems legitimate 
to speak about "the women’s movement", especially when juxtaposing 
it with the Indian judiciary. Indeed, the terminology of "the Supreme 
Court" poses similar questions, bearing in mind that judgments may be 
rendered by smaller or larger benches and that they are shaped by the 
judicial attitudes and ideological preferences of the individual judges 
(McCammon & McGrath 2015: 132). But here likewise, the trends over 
a few decades allow for general statements about "the court" itself.  
When comparing the two protagonists against the background of 
their engagement with the UCC, the rhetoric and argumentation used 
is astonishingly different. While during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
common Code was an attractive option for both actors, in recent 
decades the position of the women’s movement has shifted drastically 
from the call for a UCC. The court, instead, has kept its call for the 
Code—at least on a rhetorical level. In a variety of judgments it calls 
upon the legislator to introduce the common Code, thereby, inter-
estingly, drawing mostly on arguments of modernity and national 
integration rather than gender equality. Against the background of the 
abovementioned paradigm shift towards the acceptance of legal 
pluralism, does this mean that the women’s movement—which today is 
warning about a legislative top-down approach and suggesting reforms 
from within the religious communities has seen the signs of the time 
more clearly than the court?  
This paper argues that despite their different rhetoric, both entities 
have in actual fact accepted legal pluralism. But while the women’s 
movement has turned away from the constitutional provision of article 
44 and openly declares the UCC unfeasible, the Supreme Court still 






























demonstrating no action to push the project further. It has been 
reluctant in declaring personal laws unconstitutional and has not 
exhibited any of the activism it performed in cases regarding other 
Directive Principles. Calling for the UCC is therefore mere rhetoric.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that article 44 is a "dead letter". 
Its essence—uniformity and equality—is gradually being carried out 
through other means. It is not being achieved through an all-
encompassing legislative reform, but through a gradual shift in 
legislation, practice and judicial interpretation. The women's move-
ment pushes for these changes through its lobbying on the state level 
as well as its work on the ground in collaboration with religious com-
munities. And the judiciary (High Courts and Supreme Court) today 
actually practises precisely those piecemeal-attempts that in 1985 in 
the Shah Bano case the Supreme Court so vehemently warned about. 
It reinterprets personal laws on a case-by-case basis and thereby 
assimilates their content.  
The paper will first provide a brief overview of the history of article 
44. It will then engage with the discourse around the UCC among the 
women’s movement, hereby drawing on publications and website 
entries of women’s groups as well as (feminist) scholarship that 
reflects on the women’s movement and personal conversations with 
women who were or are active in the movement. Subsequently, it will 
engage with the discourse around article 44 within the Supreme Court, 
drawing on decisions that refer—usually in the form of obiter dicta—to 
a potential UCC. Finally, it will compare and contrast the two 
discourses and indicate a more in-depth analysis that takes into 
account both rhetoric and action.  
The Promises of Article 44  
The UCC is a counter concept to the existing personal law system, 
according to which certain family and property matters (marriage, 
divorce, maintenance, guardianship, adoption, succession and inheri-
tance) of Hindus, Muslims, Parsis and Christians as well as Jews are 
governed by their respective religious laws.1 These laws are partly 
codified and partly uncodified and customary. The idea of replacing this 
system with a uniform Code has promised and seems to mean 
different things to different entities: Gender equality to the women’s 
movement and national integration, secularism and modernity to the 






























Personal Laws and the UCC: Historical Background  
While personal laws per se are an ancient phenomenon, the Indian 
system of personal laws in its present form dates back to the late 18th 
century when the administrators of the East India Company exempted 
parts of religious law from the purview of their regulatory action 
(Bajpai 2011: 183; Parashar 1992: 62; Menski 2003: 161). Marking 
the intervention of state-centric legal regulation under increasing colo-
nial supervision, the Warren Hastings Plan of 1772 provided that 
Hindus and Muslims were to be governed by their own laws in disputes 
relating to inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages and 
institutions. Granting the colonised communities some degree of auto-
nomy helped the colonisers to dissipate the opposition to the colonial 
rule and was therefore administratively convenient (Mullally 2004: 
676). However, although in the area of penal law the British unified the 
laws with the Indian Penal Code in 1862, a similar step towards the 
unification of civil laws with regard to the family was not taken (Menski 
2008: 224). What happened, though, was that the colonisers modified 
the personal laws through the interpretation by British judges (Mann 
2007), which made them a "curious amalgam of religious rules and 
English legal concepts" (Parashar 1992: 307) and created what used to 
be called Anglo-Hindu law (Derrett 1957) and Anglo-Muhammadan 
law.  
The demand for a secular Uniform Civil Code grew with the Indian 
independence movement as such a Code was supposed to contribute 
to unity among the communities and to strengthen a common front 
against British domination (Austin 2001: 17). The debate continued 
after independence and during constitution-making (Mansfield 2005). 
The assumption of the proponents of the Code was that for the purpo-
ses of nation-building and modernisation, India required the secula-
risation of law (Baird 2005: 19-20; Parashar 1992: 230-1). Arguments 
against the UCC focused on the right to religious and cultural freedom, 
the aspects of community identity and the protection of religious 
minorities, especially against the background of India’s partition and 
the violent months that followed, which brought about a feeling of 
insecurity and anxiety especially among Muslims (Agnes 2011: 150; 
Parashar 1992: 231). The issues of gender-justice and equality were 






























Article 44 as a Compromise 
The "intricate compromise" (Menski 2008: 221), which advocates and 
opponents of the UCC agreed upon in the end, was to mention the 
Code among the Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 44 reads: 
"The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil 
code throughout the territory of India". What such a Code would look 
like, whether it would replace the personal laws or simply complement 
them, or even whether such a Code would accommodate gender 
justice is left open by the constitutional provision. Contrary to the 
Fundamental Rights in part III of the constitution, the Directive 
Principles contained in part IV "shall not be enforceable by any Court" 
while nevertheless being "fundamental in the governance of the 
country" (article 37). This means that they do not directly create any 
justiciable rights in favour of individuals, nor can a law be declared 
unconstitutional on the sole ground that it contravenes any of the 
Directive Principles, but they still function as "instruments of instruct-
tion to the Government" (Das Basu 2013: 158).  
Challenging the constitutionality of the personal laws with an alleged 
violation of article 44 is therefore not possible, but it is not completely 
absurd either, as the Supreme Court in other cases has "read" 
Directive Principles "into" Fundamental Rights.2 While those cases were 
certainly different in the sense that they concerned social or economic 
rights, and not a legislative mandate such as article 44, it is not 
beyond the imagination that the Supreme Court could increase the 
importance of article 44 through jurisprudence. The court could stress 
the importance of the Directive Principle, reading it in connection with 
the right to equality (article 14 and 15) or the principle of secularism 
enshrined in the constitution’s preamble.  
A debate about the constitutionality of the personal laws against the 
background of the right to equality arose shortly after independence. 
According to article 14 "[t]he State shall not deny to any person equal-
ity before the law or the equal protection of the laws". According to 
article 15 "[t]he State shall not discriminate against any citizen on 
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of 
them". With regard to the personal laws, these provisions play a role in 
a two-fold manner: firstly, they treat different religious communities 
differently, and secondly, they treat men and women within the same 
religious community differently. The alleged unconstitutionality was 
debated in 1952 in Narasu Appa Mali.3 The claimant challenged the 
Bombay Prevention of Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946, which imposed 






























men to practise polygamy. The Bombay High Court came to the 
conclusion that personal laws were not "laws in force" within the 
purview of article 13 of the constitution. As the constitution itself 
recognised the existence of separate personal laws, it seemed to leave 
them "unaffected" (Parashar 1992: 204-6). Hence, personal laws were 
not void even when they came into conflict with the provision of 
equality under the constitution. In a later decision the Supreme Court 
held a different view, declaring in an obiter dictum that personal laws 
"must be consistent with the Constitution lest they became void under 
article 13 if they violated fundamental rights."4  
Public Discourse and the Media  
Time and again the Uniform Civil Code features in the Indian media 
and while there is some doubt about its feasibility (De 2013), many 
authors still argue in favour of its introduction. Public debate and the 
media draw on topics similar to those that shaped the Constituent 
Assembly debates: national integration and "communal harmony", 
secularism and modernity. Personal laws have frequently been and 
continue to be depicted as problematic and in need of reform. 
Interestingly, while during the British rule it was especially practices 
of Hindu law, such as child marriage, sati and the ban on widow 
remarriage that were regarded as societal evils and in need of reform, 
the focus of critique later shifted to Muslim law (Kishwar 1986: 5-6). 
In particular, with the reforms of Hindu personal law in the 1950s, 
Hindu law came to be seen as modern (and more gender-just), while 
Muslim personal law was and still is depicted as backward and 
uncivilised. A heyday for this anti-Muslim rhetoric was the mid-1980s, 
a time of communalised tension fuelled by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Shah Bano.5 In this case, the court granted post-divorce main-
tenance to a divorced Muslim woman, using extremely biased language 
and defaming Muslim personal law. Nadja-Christina Schneider, who 
evaluated the English speaking media in India before and after the 
Shah Bano case, shows how undifferentiated Muslim personal law and 
the Muslim community were depicted. The media created the impres-
sion that the Muslim minority comprises a homogenous "mass of fana-
tics" and potentially violent "fundamentalists" from which only a small 
number of "modern" or "liberal" Muslims sets itself apart (Schneider 
2005: 196). Often the Indian press (deliberately) confused Muslim 
personal laws with Islamic criminal law, thereby reinforcing the picture 






























Women’s rights and gender equality for a long time only played a 
secondary role in the media and in the public debate around the UCC. 
The Working Group for Women’s Rights (WGWR) held that in a debate 
revolving around dichotomies of nation vs. community, individual vs. 
collective, and majority vs. minorities "women as a category are 
rendered invisible" (WGWR 1996: 1182). This is astonishing, as 
women’s rights groups were actually formed long before independence 
and the women’s movement demanded a Uniform Civil Code as early 
as 1937 (Menon 2012: 151). From the 1960s onwards the discourse 
around the UCC was sporadically linked to women’s rights and later 
(especially in the 1980s) women’s groups began to vehemently push 
for the Code as a means to ensure gender-just laws for women in all 
religious communities (Sunder Rajan 2008: 85). To be sure, in recent 
times, the media has provided a more differentiated picture than in the 
1980s when it comes to personal laws: More commentators focus on 
aspects such as justice and gender equality and pay attention to all 
personal laws, rather than putting their sole focus on the Muslim 
community (Schneider 2005: 264). Nevertheless, the public debate 
tackles the gender dimension of the personal laws only superficially. 
Only feminists, states Nivedita Menon, have openly denounced the 
"constitutionally enshrined inequality between men and women" 
(Menon 2012: 151).  
Article 44 in the Discourse of the Women’s Movement  
Not surprisingly, in their engagement with the personal laws, Indian 
women’s rights activists and women’s groups focus on "legal equality 
for women" (Parashar 1992: 203). To a large degree, they have had a 
critical view of the personal laws - regarding them as being formed in 
patriarchal societies and pointing out that many provisions discriminate 
against women. Against this background, the UCC has long held the 
promise of providing for a gender just reform and the women’s 
movement has long used the reference to article 44 along with the 
right to equality and secularism to push for legislative changes.  
Interestingly, however, this position has shifted drastically over 
time. This was, on the one hand, due to a "hijacking" of the topic by 
Hindu nationalist parties, with which many women’s activists did not 
want to be associated. On the other hand, ideas of intersectionality 
gained importance in feminist scholarship and led to a rethinking 
among activists. Today, most women’s groups question the feasibility 






























approach. Instead they present more nuanced approaches regarding 
how to reform the personal laws from within the communities or how 
to provide for secular options that can coexist with the personal laws. 
These positions are supported by the movement’s work on the ground, 
in collaboration with religious communities. Article 44—taken literally—
has completely lost its appeal. 
The Women’s Movement  
India’s contemporary women’s movement is often regarded as the 
"third" women’s movement, following the social reform movement of 
the 19th century with its ambition to improve rights for women and 
the engagement of women during the struggle for independence. Its 
beginning is usually located in the Emergency (1975-76), although 
numerous formal and informal women’s groups concerned with 
feminism and women’s rights were already formed in the early 1970s 
(Agnihotri 2001). Throughout the decades the movement has 
addressed a variety of issues, such as sexual oppression of women, 
sexual harassment and rape, dowry and dowry-related crimes, proper-
ty and succession, health and women's reproductive rights, to mention 
but a few examples (Sen 2014; Kumar 1993). The personal laws have 
featured as an issue of debate throughout the decades. 
Not only in terms of the topics engaged with, but also in terms of 
forms of activism and campaigning, the movement is quite diverse and 
has witnessed some shifts over time: From the formation of autono-
mous women’s groups in the 1970s (autonomy is understood here to 
refer to various groups, including men, religious groups, political 
parties or state institutions, see Sen 2014: 335), to united fora and 
coordinated platforms in the 1980s (Agnihotri 2001), to what is often 
called an "NGOisation" of the movement in the 1990s (Sen 2014: 
337). Methods of agitation shifted from public campaigns, demon-
strations, and street theatre (Kumar 1993: 143) towards new 
strategies of networking, gender-sensitisation training and advocacy 
(Sen 2014: 337). Women’s groups have engaged with "the law" on 
various levels, most importantly through campaigning for legislative 
changes and taking up individual cases to follow them through the 
intricacies of the courts (Kumar 1993: 143).  
Feminist Critique of the Personal Laws 
Featuring only as one issue among many, the personal laws, never-






























over time. Debates among women’s groups as well as within feminist 
scholarship are distinct from the public discourse, not only in the sense 
that they focus on the gender dimension, but also in the sense that 
they look at the personal laws of all religious communities, rather than 
singling out the Muslim personal law as problematic. They stress that 
despite the differences among them, the personal laws of all commu-
nities contain aspects that contradict the right to equality. While it 
should not be undermined, that there exist women’s groups—for 
instance those affiliated with Hindu nationalist parties—to which this 
might not apply, the general trend seems to be one that tries to expli-
citly disrupt the notion of only Muslim law being archaic and anti-
women.  
To provide a detailed list of the discriminatory aspects of the 
different personal laws is beyond the capacity of this paper. In order to 
be complete, such a list would have to go beyond the wordings of the 
provisions as stated in certain acts and beyond the dominant custom-
ary law, and take into account the laws as they are interpreted by the 
courts and as they are practised on the ground. For the purpose of this 
paper one would also have to look at changes over time and engage 
with provisions that used to be discriminatory and therefore formed 
part of the debate among the women's movement, but have—partly as 
a reaction to the feminist struggle - been amended in order to comply 
with Fundamental Rights. Scholars like Parashar (2005), Jenkins 
(2009) and Agnes (2011) and women’s rights organisations like Saheli 
and the Working Group on Women’s Rights have engaged in detail with 
the problematic aspects of the personal laws and the dynamics around 
them. Here it shall suffice to give a few examples.  
A woman under Hindu law cannot adopt a child in her own name. 
Nor has she guardianship rights over her child who is above five years 
of age. Until 2005 daughters could not be coparceners of the Hindu 
Joint Family property. But even after the Hindu Succession (Amend-
ment) Act from 2005 unequal provisions remain. For instance, when a 
female Hindu dies intestate, any property she has inherited from her 
husband will pass to the husband’s heirs, while such a provision does 
not exist in respect of men who die intestate. Muslim husbands are 
entitled to practise polygamy while Muslim wives can only have one 
husband. A Muslim husband can dissolve the marriage unilaterally 
through (triple) talaq, while it is much harder for the wife to achieve a 
divorce. The women’s share under Islamic inheritance law remains less 
than that of her male counterpart. The Indian Succession Act of 1925 






























children who have left no will. The property is instead inherited by the 
father, or—if he is not alive—by the siblings. For a long time, Christian 
Personal Law was also subject to debate because Section 10 of the 
Indian Succession Act stipulated that while a husband could get 
divorced only on the ground of adultery, the wife had to prove adultery 
plus an additional divorce ground such as cruelty or desertion. This 
was changed in the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Bill in 2001. Parsi law 
until 1991 discriminated between female and male descendants.  
Overall, the Working Group on Women’s Rights (WGWR) concluded 
in 1996: "All personal laws are highly discriminatory against women 
since they are based on an interpretation of religion that sanctions 
patriarchy and resists democratic and egalitarian relations between 
men and women outside as well as within the family" (WGWR 1996: 
1181). Feminist scholars criticise the fact that personal laws are rarely 
amended in order to adapt to social change and mostly remain 
"fossilised in the name of religious inviolability" (Parashar 2005: 307). 
Now, this feminist critique of the personal laws might lead to the 
assumption that feminist scholars and women’s rights activists favour 
the enactment of a secular Uniform Civil Code. While this was indeed 
the case in the 1970s and 1980s, interestingly it no longer is. The call 
for a UCC has now mostly been given up as a feasible option.  
Calling for a UCC 
While a few early demands for a UCC from the side of the women’s 
movement had already been made in the pre-independence era6, the 
issue became a hot topic among the nascent women’s movement of 
the 1970s. At this time, there was a general position among the 
movement to support the introduction of the UCC. In these years, the 
feminist pro-UCC position (in order to achieve gender justice) was not 
consciously articulated as distinct from the "mainstream discourse of 
national integration", but rather seemed to be "part of the same 
project" (Menon 1998: 251). This intersection of the arguments of 
equality and nationalism can also be seen in the report of the 
Committee on the Status on Women in India.7 Calling for the 
"expeditious implementation" of a Uniform Civil Code, the report does 
mention the gender-inequality of the personal laws, but at the same 
time regards them as being "against the spirit of national integration". 
The absence of a UCC is depicted as "an incongruity that cannot be 































The standpoint became more differentiated during the 1980s. While 
the call for the UCC at first remained the dominant position among 
activists and women’s groups, many in the movement began to rethink 
their argumentation. For Menon (1998: 252) the period of mass 
discontent following the state of emergency marked the beginning of a 
rethinking among feminists, as it became clear that the "national 
integrity" argument was a farce, in that it was primarily Hindu integrity 
that was to be protected. Women’s rights activists now intended to 
make clear that the Code they envisioned was distinct from the one 
that Hindu nationalist parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
aimed at. While the women’s movement had a secular gender-just 
UCC in mind, went the argument, the BJP would only use the name of 
a uniform Code in order to impose Hindu law on the whole population. 
Kishwar (1986: 13) in her magazine Manushi – A Journal about 
Women and Society, calls women’s organisations to action in order to 
draft a UCC based on "the principles of fairness and equality" lest the 
UCC becomes a Hindu project. The UCC that the BJP aims at, she 
warns, would be "'common' only in name, common in the sense that it 
will be imposed on everyone" (Kishwar 1986: 10). 
The Delhi-based women’s group Saheli argues similarly. Regarding 
all religions as oppressive "products of a less developed society", the 
introduction of a UCC is seen as the only solution to get rid of the 
"continued exploitation based on religion" (Saheli 1986). Secularism, 
in the view of the organisation, stands for modernity, growth and 
development and is necessarily connected to gender justice. Hence, a 
UCC is needed so that women no longer have to "live with a medieval 
concept of family" (Saheli 1986). In a similar vein as Kishwar, Saheli 
distances itself from the rhetoric of the "Hindu Communalists", whose 
rhetoric has led to a "misunderstanding" of the demand for a UCC 
(Saheli 1986). There were also minority women who favoured the 
enactment of a UCC during the 1980s. A female Muslim journalist 
called for the introduction of a UCC in the Times of India (see Kishwar 
1986: 5) and the national convention of the Young Christian Women’s 
Association (YCWA) in 1982 and in 1986 passed resolutions in favour 
of a UCC (Parashar 1992: 242). 
Not only calling the parliament to act, but also taking matters into 
their own hands, a variety of different actors—among them many 
women’s groups—worked on the possible content of a UCC and 
introduced draft codes into parliament (Agnes 2011: 177). Parashar 
envisions a gender-just UCC being built on three distinct pillars: firstly, 






























systems", secondly, "desirable features from the civil laws of other 
countries", and thirdly, provisions of "international conventions and 
agreements" (Parashar 1992: 256-60). Overall, there was a strong 
demand among feminists and women's rights groups for the imple-
mentation of a UCC. Until the mid-1980s the women’s movement was 
relatively united and it did not seem unlikely at this point in time that 
it would push parliament to take the project further.  
Rethinking the Agenda 
In the late 1980s a slow and gradual paradigm shift set in, which influ-
enced the position of the women’s movement. There were several 
interconnected reasons for this shift. Firstly, while earlier feminists and 
women’s rights activists distanced themselves from the position of the 
Hindu right, but kept their call for a UCC, it seems that at a certain 
point they were no longer willing or capable to follow this path. Events 
like the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Shah Bano case in 1985 and the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992 led to a "commu-
nalised" climate, in which the women’s movement no longer wanted to 
share the same goal as the BJP. Secondly, the idea of "inter-
sectionality" gained importance and a strict dichotomy between religi-
ous freedom and women’s rights did not seem adequate any more.  
The Shah Bano case dealt with a claim for maintenance filed by a 
divorced Muslim woman against her ex-husband. The Supreme Court 
in its judgment rejected the ex-husband’s claim that under Muslim 
personal law he was not required to pay maintenance after the iddat 
period (roughly three months) and after having paid her an amount as 
mehr (a form of dower). Instead, the judges held that the secular 
provision of Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) applies to 
all citizens irrespective of their religion and hence overrides the 
personal laws (for a detailed description of the case see Bajpai 2011: 
180). The judgment led to severe agitation among the Muslim 
population, stirred further by the Muslim Personal Law Board, which 
regarded the judgment as an interference by the court in Muslim 
personal law (Bajpai 2011: 180-1). Shortly after the ruling, the Rajiv 
Gandhi government enacted a law that took Muslims out of the 
purview of Section 125 CrPC: the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act (MWA). Many saw this act as a step away from the 
UCC, as one religious community was precisely taken out of the 
purview of a secular law, which was previously applicable to all. 






























legislation as "a glaring defeat of principles of gender justice and 
secularism" (Agnes 2011: 157). But critique also came from Hindu 
nationalists, who commented that the act was "separate legislation 
exclusively for Muslims" and it afforded "preferential treatment" to the 
minority (Dhavan 2001: 317-8).  
The fact that in this context the BJP made the topic of the UCC part 
of its own political agenda has led to much critique. Scholars have 
accused the party for using the UCC as a "political weapon" (Kishwar 
1993: 3), and as a tool to silence religious minorities (Mullally 2004: 
673) and to "chastise" them "for not emulating the Hindu example" 
(Dhavan 2001: 317). It is this supposed "hijacking of the secular 
agenda" (Mullally 2004: 673) that ultimately led feminists and 
women’s groups to disassociate themselves from the call for a UCC. In 
a tense political climate, the women’s rights groups that traditionally 
had associated themselves predominantly with the political left were 
no longer willing or capable to share this "uneasy alliance with Hindu 
right-wing groups" (Agnes 2012: 35), fearing that their pressing for a 
UCC would now strengthen the Hindu nationalists. Some women’s 
groups maintained their position but changed their terminology, drop-
ping the term "uniform", and now speaking of a "common", a "gender-
just" or an "egalitarian" civil Code. Saheli, for instance, began to speak 
of an Egalitarian Civil Code (ECC), making clear that the Code of the 
BJP and its own Code "connote two completely different concepts" 
(Saheli 1995). Most groups, however, gave up their call for a UCC 
completely. 
The second aspect that provoked the shift within the movement was 
the realisation that the secularisation of laws might not be a universal 
remedy for the situation of all women. The case of Shah Bano herself, 
who in her fight for maintenance rights came under so much pressure 
from her own community that ultimately she rejected for herself the 
maintenance right the court had approved (Menon 2012: 153; Gangoli 
2007: 41), revealed a common problem: the conflict of multiple 
interests, obligations and identities of religious women. The "inter-
section" of two or more identities is described by Kimberlé Crenshaw. 
She depicts how belonging to different subordinate groups means 
being multiply burdened and marginalised (Crenshaw 1989: 140). 
Furthermore, minority women often feel obliged to choose between the 
conflicting political agendas that the different groups to which they 
belong pursue (Crenshaw 1991: 1251-2). Agnes (2012: 36) applies 






























decide between "her claims for gender equality" and "her religious 
beliefs and community affiliations". 
Today the importance of intersectionality is generally accepted 
among the Indian women’s movement.8 Regarding the personal laws, 
however, this paradigm shift has made the struggle for gender justice 
more complex. Women’s rights activists today acknowledge that the 
problem cannot easily be solved by placing the right to equality in 
opposition to the freedom of religion and giving the one prevalence 
over the other through the introduction of a secular Code. In Jenkin’s 
(2009: 927) view, understanding the religious freedom of women 
"means considering the intersection of gender and religious identities". 
Sunder Rajan (2008: 80) speaks of a "double commitment" of the 
women’s groups who "cannot confine their struggles to women’s 
interests alone" but must "be sensitive" to minority claims as well. 
New Approaches  
While a paradigm shift is clearly visible away from the call for a UCC, 
there is not as yet a common position regarding what to aim for 
instead. The 1990s witnessed something of a crisis of the women’s 
movement regarding the personal laws: Lacking a common standpoint, 
the movement was fragmented with different sub-groups, sometimes 
battling against each other. While the basic view that all personal laws 
reveal gender-discriminatory aspects remained, the solutions that were 
suggested varied. Today, many activists regard the replacement of the 
personal laws with a Uniform Civil Code (even if termed an Egalitarian 
Civil Code) a top-down approach, which would harm the interests of 
religious women and would not be able to change the situation on the 
ground.  
One idea that tries to accommodate both calls for a secular law as 
well as the interests of religious communities is that of an optional 
gender-just civil Code. According to this concept ordinarily personal 
laws would prevail, but people would have the choice to opt for the 
secular Code, which would ensure gender equality. To a certain degree 
such an optional Code is already in place with the Special Marriage Act 
of 1954 (SMA). While this secular law was initially enacted as a 
provision for interreligious marriages, its mechanism of civil marriage 
can also be utilised by members of the same faith. This act, it has 
been suggested, could be taken as a starting point for a secular Code 
that encompasses other aspects of law and even goes beyond the 






























rights of women. A practical model for such an optional Code was 
drafted in the 1990s by the Forum Against the Oppression of Women 
(Menon 1998: 258). 
Critique of this proposition points out that such an "option" would 
benefit only a limited number of women. "Given the present imbalance 
of power and resources", states the women’s group Saheli, any law 
based on such "voluntary" elements is "bound to remain ineffective" 
(Saheli 1997). Considering this, it has been proposed to "reverse" the 
element of choice, meaning that the application of the secular and 
gender-just law would be the norm, while an individual or a couple 
could voluntarily opt for personal law if they desired. A practical 
proposal for such a Code has been put forward by the Working Group 
on Women’s Rights. According to this proposal, a comprehensive 
package of gender-just laws would cover equal rights for women not 
just within the family but also within a wider scope, for instance, in the 
sphere of work (WGWR 1996). 
An optional UCC would still fulfil the constitutional aspiration of 
article 44, while at the same time leaving the personal laws in place 
and therefore acknowledging religious identities. The idea is also 
attractive as such a Code could go hand in hand with legal reforms of 
the personal laws as such. As long as these reforms do not take place 
though, the situation remains problematic. Indira Jaising, founder 
secretary of the Lawyer’s Collective, writes: "if the choice is to be 
meaningful at all, it must be between gender-just secular law and 
personal laws that comply with the requirements of equality. Unequal 
laws ought not to be enforced by the State" (Jaising 2005: 16). 
It seems that the dominant position among feminists and women’s 
groups today is that of reforms "from within" the religious 
communities. Flavia Agnes with her Mumbai-based organisation Majlis 
was arguably the earliest advocate for this strategy. Later others 
followed this route. In Agnes' view "small and significant reforms 
within the personal laws governing minority communities have greater 
relevance to minority women than the rhetoric of an all-encompassing 
and overarching Uniform Civil Code (UCC) with its communal 
undertones" (Agnes 2001: 3973, similarly Rahman 1990: 498). 
The left-leaning All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA), 
which initially supported a UCC, now favours a gradual change from 
within the communities (Murthy and Dasgupta 2011: 129). The Muslim 
women's organisation Bharatia Muslim Mahila Andolan (2015) pushes 






























Muslim Family Act. Organisations like Awaaz-e-Niswan and the 
Women’s Research and Action Group in Mumbai, the Confederation of 
Voluntary Associations (COVA) in Hyderabad, the Muslim Women’s 
Forum in Delhi and the Tamil Nadu Muslim Women’s Jamaat have 
constantly pushed for reforms in Muslim personal law (Murthy 
&Dasgupta 2011: 124). Other groups like the Joint Women’s Pro-
gramme have been working with some success to reform the Christian 
personal laws since the 1980s (ibid.: 129). 
While the pitfalls of this approach are its "slow and gradual" 
transformation (Agnes 2001: 3976) and the danger that in the process 
of bargaining for reforms with religious community leaders feminist 
goals might be watered down (Parashar 1992: 229), it seems that the 
idea of reforms from within is today widely approved among the 
women’s movement. While the gender discriminatory aspects of per-
sonal laws and the need for reform are still stressed, the idea that the 
religious personal laws must be wiped out completely has mostly been 
abandoned. Legal pluralism is accepted as a fact. Contrary to the argu-
ment of earlier days, the reference to the Directive Principle in article 
44 is today left aside. 
Article 44 in the Decisions of the Supreme Court 
In a number of cases over the last decades the Supreme Court has 
called for the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code. It refers to article 
44 even in cases that do not deal in particular with the personal laws, 
frequently in obiter dicta, and reminds the legislator of its response-
bility under the Directive Principle. The idea of the uniform Code is 
often connected to topics of national integration, civilisation and devel-
opment. Only in more recent cases has gender equality featured 
explicitly as an issue.  
However, a more in-depth analysis, especially when keeping in mind 
that the Indian Supreme Court has been hailed as "the most powerful 
court in the world" (Jaising 2011: 257; Sathe 2002: 249), reveals a 
certain reluctance on the part of the court in relation to the area of 
personal laws. India’s Supreme Court enjoys the power of judicial 
review and a reputation as an independent and activist court (Williams 
2006: 162). Public interest litigation has fostered the rights of vulner-
able groups of people and has addressed a variety of issues from 
prisoners’ rights and bonded labourers to environmental concerns 
(Guruswamy and Aspatwar 2013). It has "turned" Directive Principles 






























21, the right to life9, and it has given rather precise orders to the 
government, going so far that some have critiqued it as overstepping 
its judicial powers (Sood 2008).  
Against this background, the court’s call for a UCC seems to be 
mere rhetoric. Not only has the court never declared the personal laws 
as such unconstitutional, but it has also avoided an in-depth analysis 
of the constitutionality of particular provisions in specific cases. Indira 
Jaising speaks of a "hands-off approach" of the judiciary when it comes 
to the personal laws (Jaising 2000: 290). The court indeed refers to 
article 44, but at the same time draws a clear line between its own 
function and the tasks of the legislator or the government (which col-
lectively are often referred to as "the state"). Implicitly it draws on the 
argument of the separation of powers, making clear that it cannot 
interfere with the tasks of the two other powers. The question of why it 
is precisely the area of personal laws that the hands of the court are 
tied, while in other areas it has exhibited a much more activist stand, 
remains unanswered. Overall, the following analysis of judgments 
reveals a strange paradox between the court’s call for a UCC on the 
one hand and a notable reluctance to take any concrete action on the 
other. 
Tentative Reminders 
In a few early cases from the 1970s and early 1980s the Supreme 
Court mentioned article 44 among other Directive Principles in order to 
remind the other two powers of their constitutional obligations. These 
cases do not deal specifically with personal laws. Rather, Article 44 is 
mentioned as one example among others. In Kesavananda10 (1973) 
for instance, the court bemoaned that the government "has not been 
able to take any effective steps" towards the realisation of the UCC, a 
goal that is "essentially desirable in the interest of the integrity, and 
unity of the country". At the same time, however, the court declared 
that the judiciary can "obviously" not "compel the government to lay 
down a uniform civil code" (ibid.).  
The court did something similar in a decision from 198211, in which 
it stressed that article 44 along with other Directive Principles should 
be "implemented either by the Legislature or by the Executive." 
Despite seeing possible conflicts between the personal laws and the 
right to equality, the court did not regard itself as capable or in a 
position to push for concrete changes. "The only solution for many of 






























priate organs of the State to do their assigned job in the best interests 
of the Community" (ibid.).  
Both decisions implicitly drew on the separation of powers. The 
language the court used is slightly hesitant compared to later cases; 
the court reminded the other organs rather gently of article 44. 
Although there are references to national integrity and the unity of the 
country, there is no further engagement with these topics.  
Communal Undertones: the Shah Bano Case and its Aftermath  
The language of the Supreme Court became much harsher and its call 
for a UCC became more vehement in the mid-1980s, beginning with 
the Shah Bano case12 from 1985. The judgment has been contro-
versial, not so much because of the decision itself, but rather because 
of its language, which unnecessarily links article 44 to the topic of 
national integration, deploys negative stereotypes against Islam and 
singles out the helpless situation of Muslim women (Kishwar 1986; 
Agnes 2011: 157). Similarly as in the two cases cited above, this 
judgment begins with a general remark, stating that it is "a matter of 
regret" that article 44 "has remained a dead letter". It then states that 
a UCC would "help the cause of national integration by removing 
disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies" (Mohd. 
Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum). It is clear that here the court is 
referring to the Muslim community, which, it assumes, has delayed the 
process of legal unification. Here again, the court calls upon the "state" 
to have the "political courage" to use its competence for large-scale 
reforms. Despite regarding the judiciary as a "reformer"—and hereby 
granting itself a stronger position than in the earlier cases—the court 
nevertheless clarifies that itself should not step in and make "piece-
meal" attempts at changes through case law.  
The court does refer to gender inequality under the personal laws, 
when it points out that "large segments of society [...] have been 
traditionally subjected to unjust treatment. Women are one such 
segment" (ibid.). It further states that the case at hand raises issues 
of general interest, which are of relevance "not only to Muslim women, 
not only to women generally but, to all those who, aspiring to create 
an equal society of men and women, lure themselves into the belief 
that mankind has achieved a remarkable degree of progress in that 
direction" (ibid.). As positive as this gender sensitive reference might 
appear at first sight, the anti-Muslim bias, on which the judgment 






























put forward here. Rather, the plight of the Muslim woman is used to 
defame Muslim personal law as "ruthless in its inequality" (ibid.). In 
fact, neither article 14 nor the right to equality is mentioned in the 
decision. Instead, the judgment draws on the development argument 
and deploys an image of societal progress from an unjust to a just 
society in which the UCC would help as a vehicle to foster this 
development.  
Only one month after the judgment in the Shah Bano case, the 
Supreme Court dealt with the UCC again. Ms Jordan Diengdeh v. S.S. 
Chopra13 concerned the constitutionality of the Hindu Marriage Act. 
The judgment begins with a reference to Shah Bano and an emphasis 
on the "urgency of infusing life into Art. 44". The lack of a Uniform Civil 
Code is described as a "totally unsatisfactory state of affairs" (ibid.). 
The court held: "Surely the time has now come for a complete reform 
of the law of marriage and make a uniform law applicable to all people 
irrespective of religion or caste" (ibid.). It remains unclear why it is 
precisely "now" that the time has come to begin drafting a UCC. The 
period following the Shah Bano decision was a time of communal 
tension with sharp confrontations between the Muslims and the Hindus 
and between society and the state. However, the court seems to take 
the issue of the UCC more seriously here when demanding that a copy 
of its order "may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law and Justice for 
such action as they may deem fit to take" (ibid.).  
In 1994, the petitioners in Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India14 
asked the court to "consider the question" of the enactment of a UCC 
as well as to declare the Muslim Women Act unconstitutional. Notably, 
this writ petition was dismissed immediately with the argument that 
"[t]hese are all matters for legislature. The Court cannot legislate in 
these matters".15 Why the court is not able to examine the constitu-
tionality of the MWA remains unclear. It seems that the separation of 
powers argument is deliberately used as an excuse not to deal with the 
constitutionality of the personal laws. The judgement later became an 
important reference point when the court declared itself incompetent 
to decide upon matters regarding the UCC. It is, for instance, quoted in 
Ahmedabad Women Action Group16 (1997), in which a number of 
women’s rights groups asked the Supreme Court to declare several 
aspects of the Muslim personal law unconstitutional. This promising 
case, in which different interest groups intended to litigate strategically 






























Another decision regarding article 44, which is often cited as an 
example of the communal bias of the court, is Sarla Mudgal v. Union of 
India17 (1995). In this case the Supreme Court had to decide whether 
a married Hindu man who converts to Islam can legitimately marry a 
second wife as permitted under Muslim personal law. The judgment 
begins with a citation of article 44 and dedicates a whole paragraph to 
a critique of the government with regard to its reluctance to introduce 
a UCC. The "[r]ulers of the day", the court bemoans, were apparently 
"not in a mood to retrieve Article 44 from the cold storage where it is 
lying since 1949" (ibid.). In a similar fashion as in Shah Bano, the 
judgment defames Muslim personal law and draws on the well-known 
stereotype that while the Hindus had willingly reformed their laws, the 
Muslims would be reluctant to follow suit. But it goes further than this. 
Deploying an idea of a scale of development and drawing a link 
between secularism and civilisation, the judgment states: "Article 44 is 
based on the concept that there is no necessary connection between 
religion and personal law in a civilised society" (ibid.). Furthermore, 
taking up a discourse that the Hindu nationalists have long used as a 
warning to Indian Muslims, the judgement states: "Those who 
preferred to remain in India after the partition", knew that "in the 
Indian Republic there was to be only one Nation" and hence, "no 
community could claim to remain a separate entity on the basis of 
religion".  
Feminist authors like Agnes (2011: 163) have criticised the judge-
ment’s language as pitting those who oppose the UCC (allegedly the 
Muslims) against the rest of "the Indian Nation". It is also interesting 
to note that while the 14-page judgement uses the term "uniform" 18 
times and "uniform civil code" 10 times, it only uses the term "women" 
twice, and does not refer to "gender", "equality" or article 14 at all—
another indication of the sharp contrast in argumentation between the 
women’s movement and the court.   
Rethinking?  
More recent judgments provide a mixed picture of the court’s 
standpoint. While in a decision from the 1990s, the court tentatively 
declared some scepticism regarding whether the UCC was a feasible 
option and thereby hinted at a shift in its position, in later cases the 
court went back to its earlier call for a common Code. Its earlier 






























not be helpful—was partly revised, when the court declared parts of 
the Christian personal law explicitly unconstitutional. 
In Pannalal Bansilal Pitti18 (1996), the court indeed still held the 
viewpoint that a UCC was desirable but questioned its feasibility. It 
referred to the pluralist character of the Indian society and argued that 
the constitution itself tries to balance diversity and uniformity. The 
enactment of a Uniform Civil Code, though "highly desirable" may 
"perhaps [...] be counter-productive to unity and integrity of the 
nation" if pushed through "in one go" (ibid.). This reasoning is inter-
esting, as the argument of "unity and integrity of the nation"—usually 
used by proponents of the UCC—is here used as a counter argument. 
The top-down approach of an all-encompassing legislation is regarded 
as problematic. Rather, the country should strive for "gradual 
progressive change" (ibid.). In a "slow process" the legislature should 
attempt "to remedy where the need is felt most acute" (ibid.). This 
reasoning resembles the propositions of women’s rights groups of 
more recent times outlined above. A similar argument was later, in 
2001, made in the Danial Latifi case19, where the Supreme Court held 
that it is not unreasonable in Indian law to make distinctions based on 
community membership.  
A case that is seen as a landmark decision followed in 2002, when 
the court in John Vallamattom20 engaged with the constitutionality of 
Christian personal law. After earlier hesitations, the court positioned 
itself more clearly, but at the same time deployed the old stereotypes. 
The topic of the UCC is taken up at the end of the judgment, with the 
Sarla Mudgal-argument that there is "no necessary connection 
between religious and personal law in a civilized society". The parlia-
ment is called to "step in for framing a common civil code in the 
country" as such a Code would "help the cause of national integration 
by removing the contradictions based on ideologies" (ibid.). The court 
here allows the writ petition and declares the specific provision, 
Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, "unreasonable", "arbitrary 
and discriminatory and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Consti-
tution" (ibid.). On the one hand, in this decision the court was more 
courageous than in earlier cases, where it simply avoided an engage-
ment with the constitutionality of personal law provisions. On the other 
hand, the case again reveals communal undertones with its reference 
to "national integration" and the "civilised society".  
Finally, in two recent cases, the court again referred to article 44. In 






























under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. 
To the court, this act is "a small step in reaching the goal enshrined by 
Article 44" (ibid.). While holding that "[p]ersonal beliefs and faiths 
must be honoured", the court stressed the importance of secular legal 
options "until such time that the vision of a uniform Civil Code is 
achieved" (ibid.). In a case from 201522, the court dealt with the topic 
of a mother’s guardianship for her child born out of wedlock. Fostering 
the rights of single mothers, the court also commented on the personal 
law and on the UCC more generally, stating that "India is a secular 
nation and it is a cardinal necessity that religion be distanced from 
law" and "underscoring" that the Directive Principles envision a 
Uniform Civil Code (ibid.). 
Comparative Thoughts Beyond Rhetoric 
This paper has analysed the discourse around article 44 within two 
different entities: the women’s movement and the Indian Supreme 
Court. It has juxtaposed what the Uniform Civil Code means for these 
two actors and revealed that while initially there was a call for the UCC 
from both the women's movement as well as the court, the former has 
undergone a radical shift in its position and rhetoric while the latter 
has to a greater or lesser extent maintained its position, at least on a 
rhetorical level. This last part of the paper will compare and contrast 
the discourses among the two protagonists and look beyond the level 
of mere rhetoric.  
Reading the Signs of the Times 
The discussion above has demonstrated that the two entities today 
have very different standpoints. The women’s movement has within 
the past 40 years flip-flopped its position. Earlier deeming the UCC a 
universal remedy for discrimination against women, it now regards the 
Code as a threat. It is sceptical about the feasibility of a legislative top-
down approach and prefers other options to achieve gender justice, in 
particular reforms from within the religious communities. The Supreme 
Court has maintained its position to a greater or lesser extent, and 
time and again has called for the introduction of a UCC. The paper has 
further shown that the discourse of the two entities revolves around 
very different arguments: The women’s movement in its engagement 
with the personal laws draws on the right to equality. Women’s groups 
also explicitly distance themselves from the position and rhetoric of the 






























Egalitarian rather than a Uniform Civil Code in order to make clear that 
they do not affiliate with the Hindu nationalists. The Supreme Court, 
on the other hand, draws on arguments of national integration, 
civilisation, secularism and modernity, and thereby deploys a similar 
rhetoric to that of the Hindu nationalists, frequently even using biased 
statements against the Muslim community. 
Against the background of a global paradigm shift towards the 
acceptance of legal pluralism, this poses significant questions. Has the 
women’s movement seen the signs of the time more clearly than the 
court? Is the movement more realistic than the court in its scepticism 
towards top-down legislative approaches? Has it walked on while the 
Supreme Court has held onto a concept of modernity from the middle 
of the last century? Today’s goals are certainly different from the goals 
of the 1940s; modernity is no longer necessarily defined through legal 
uniformity and today’s means to achieve social change are different 
from the means of the past. Has the women’s movement understood 
and accepted this while the court has not?   
As has been demonstrated, the shift in the position of the women’s 
movement is partly due to the movement’s worry that a further call for 
the UCC would foster the BJP’s alleged project of a "Hindu Code." 
Therefore, to a certain degree, the movement has pulled back out of 
fear rather than changed its position due to a deliberate reconsider-
ation. The incoherence of the different positions among the movement 
during the 1990s illustrates this very well. But there are also other 
reasons for the parading shift among the movement. Its own often 
frustrating experience with the non-implementation of state laws on 
the ground and the increased awareness of intersectionality have led 
the movement to the understanding that other options might be more 
constructive than the top-down enactment of an all-encompassing 
UCC. 
Feminists and women’s groups today are calling for the expansion of 
the already existing secular laws and their better implementation in 
order to protect women's rights. Furthermore, they propose to work 
out reforms of the personal laws in collaboration with religious 
community leaders and the communities more broadly. While this 
ground level approach is certainly slow, it might well be a more 
successful strategy. In the delicate area of personal laws, which is 
closely linked to identity politics, this approach respects the interests 
of the communities and is therefore more accepted. This was well 






























personal laws in 2001. In this sense, the women’s movement is 
following the global trend towards accepting legal pluralism as a fact 
and working with it. The court, it seems, has missed this trend. But 
maybe a closer look is necessary here. 
Lip Service to the Constitution 
At least on a rhetorical basis, the Supreme Court has kept its pro-UCC 
position throughout the decades, calling upon the legislator to 
introduce the uniform Code. On the other hand, it has never gone as 
far as to declare the personal law system as such unconstitutional. On 
the contrary, in the ambit of the religion-based laws, the Supreme 
Court has not exhibited the same activist stand that it has demon-
strated in other areas. Instead, it has frequently played the ball back 
to the legislator, implicitly drawing on the argumentation of separation 
of powers (which it seems not to take as seriously when it comes to 
other aspects of the legal landscape). The court has even been 
criticised as deploying "avoidance strategies" when engaging with the 
personal laws (Jaising 2005). 
To be sure, it is beyond the capacity and the tasks of the court to 
draft a Code itself. But comparing the above-mentioned decisions with 
other case law and bearing in mind the activist role of the court, which 
elsewhere has strengthened the importance of Directive Principles, the 
court seems rather reluctant in this area. Why was the court not more 
radical in striking down as unconstitutional those parts of the personal 
laws that contradict the right to equality? Why did it not set the legis-
lator a time limit for the drafting of a UCC? Why did it not stipulate 
concrete guidelines for such a Code? The court’s call for a UCC remains 
largely undifferentiated. Questions such as what that Code should 
encompass, who should be involved in the drafting process, which 
values should be included, and how it should be ensured that the 
rights and identities of minorities and women are adequately respect-
ted, are neither posed nor answered in the court’s decisions. Had the 
court taken the idea of the UCC seriously, one might reason, it would 
have pushed it further. Its reluctance to exhibit more concrete action 
shows that it does not give priority to the matter.   
This reluctance to go beyond mere rhetoric could have different root 
causes. It could be that the personal laws are simply too hot a topic. 
The personal laws are closely linked to community identity. The court 
might fear communal backlashes if it were to strike down elementary 






























identity. The Shah Bano case demonstrated how easily communal 
tension and riots are provoked. Hence, the court might be trying to 
avoid further stirring up this critical issue. However, this argument-
tation does not fit well with the fact that the court itself so frequently 
uses an anti-minority rhetoric. In Shah Bano it was more the language 
than the decision itself that provoked the backlash. Two cases23 before 
Shah Bano were actually decided in a very similar manner without 
using such biased language and hence were broadly accepted. There-
fore, the argument that the Supreme Court avoids provocation is not 
entirely convincing.  
Another explanation for why the court refrains from pushing for 
further action in this area might be that in actual fact it has accepted 
legal pluralism itself. It might, just like the women’s movement, regard 
a top-down legislative approach as problematic. This argumentation is 
supported by the fact that the Indian judiciary today practices a lot of 
small-scale reform on a case-by-case basis, as is further explained 
below. If the Supreme Court itself does not believe in the UCC any 
more, then the question remains, however, as to why on a rhetorical 
level it still calls for it. Why is this pseudo-call for a UCC deployed 
without putting the rhetoric further into action? 
Here it is certainly the different aims and tasks of the two entities 
and the different expectations towards them that shed light on the 
issue. The women's movement is a political player. It conducts interest 
politics for a certain interest group. It can ask for whatever it wishes. 
Hence, it can ignore article 44. It reacts to international trends and 
changes in feminist scholarship, such as the idea of intersectionality. 
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, is a state organ entrusted with 
the interpretation of the constitution. Article 44 is part of the consti-
tution and hence must be taken into account—if only by paying lip 
service to it. The analysis of the cases above seems to demonstrate 
just that: the Supreme Court pays lip service to the constitution by 
calling for the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code while at the same 
time not pushing the implementation any further.  
The Essence of Article 44 
If legal pluralism as a concept is accepted by the women’s movement 
and by the Indian Supreme Court as well as more broadly, does this 
consequently mean that article 44 is a "dead letter" as the Court called 
it in the Shah Bano case? One could certainly regard it as a constitu-






























present day. The idea of uniformity of laws as a prerequisite to 
modernity is questionable today. The enactment of a UCC for the 
whole Indian territory seems currently unlikely. The several draft codes 
prepared by women's groups and academics in the 1980s and 1990s 
have not been realised. Today, despite the fact that the BJP mentioned 
the enactment of the uniform Code in its election manifesto and—in 
terms of the current composition of parliament—could probably push 
this project through, the Modi government has mostly been quiet on 
the issue. Werner Menski (2006: 52) describes the call for a UCC, if 
understood as an abolition of the personal laws and the complete 
restructuring of the Indian legal system, as "asking for the moon, 
totally unrealistic and simply not feasible." In this sense the UCC is 
dead. 
Nevertheless, the debate around the reform of personal laws 
continues. The women’s movement is still engaged in finding ways to 
provide for gender justice. And the judiciary is challenged time and 
again with the interpretation of personal law provisions. Hence, the 
question is whether the essence of article 44 is actually being brought 
about through other means than through an all-encompassing Code. 
Women’s groups often work in a threefold manner: firstly, they 
lobby for the enactment or amendment of specific legal provisions on 
the state level; secondly, they litigate cases in order to challenge 
problematic provisions in court and push for new and better case law; 
and thirdly, they work on the ground in collaboration with communi-
ties. Through this holistic approach the women’s movement has provi-
ded for gender justice in a variety of areas. Not only that, it has also 
pushed for an assimilation of the personal laws by other means. This 
activism is part of what Sezgin calls a "revolution [...] in the personal 
status system of many postcolonial nations" coming about "as a result 
of a grand bargaining between progressive and conservative forces in 
each society" (Sezgin 2010a: 29-30).  
In this step-by-step revolution, the judiciary plays a central role too. 
In the Shah Bano decision the court held that "piecemeal attempts of 
courts to bridge the gap between personal Laws cannot take the place 
of a common Civil Code. Justice to all is a far more satisfactory way of 
dispensing justice than justice from case to case". But looking at the 
present day reality and at the judiciary more broadly, it seems that it 
is precisely these piecemeal attempts that have occurred throughout 
the last decades. Agnes (2011), Subramanian (2014) and Serajuddin 






























makes the legal world in the area of personal laws more gender just 
and at the same time assimilates the personal laws more and more. 
Courts in this sense function as quasi legislators in a trend of juristo-
cracy (Hirschl 2004). In the delicate context of personal laws, this 
step-by-step activism might actually be a more efficient way to 
achieve change without provoking communal backlashes.  
Hence, personal laws are being amended through holistic 
cooperation between different actors in the state. In Menski’s words, 
"India has devised a strategy of carefully planned minor changes over 
a long span of time" through an "intricate interplay between judicial 
activism and parliamentary intervention" (Menski 2008: 218). The 
argument here is that slowly the various personal laws have been 
made more and more similar, and are today in effect largely 
harmonised, though they remain formally different. In this way, India 
has found a "mirror image" of the UCC (Menski 2008: 213). 
Consequently, article 44 is still very much alive, in the sense that its 
essence—uniformity and equality—is provided through other means. 
Endnotes 
* This article has previously been published in Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 49 (2016) 2, 148-
74. The author would like to thank Professor Philipp Dann and Professor Werner Menski for their 
support, guidance and input in the research and writing of this article.  
1 Parashar criticises the terminology of "laws" in this context. She argues that scholars who label 
the various customs and social practices as "law" would achieve an "implied immunity from 
questioning of those practices because they are law" and thereby enable "institutional 
discrimination" (Parashar 2013: 17). The following analysis, however, will show how personal 
laws—despite being labelled "laws"—are indeed severely criticised and contested (especially by 
the women’s movement) and as a consequence sometimes amended. 
2 In Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and others (1992) 3 SCC 666 and Unii Krishnan J.P. and 
others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (1993) 1 SCC 645 the Supreme Court held that the 
right to education is a Fundamental Right enshrined in Article 21 of the constitution. 
3 The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84. 
4 C. Masilamani Mudaliar & Ors v. The Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, 1996 AIR, 1697. 
5 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Ors, AIR 1985 SC 945. 
6 One of the active advocates of a UCC was the All India Women's Conference (AIWC), arguably 
the oldest national women’s organisation, founded in 1927 (Agnes 2011, 149, Parashar 1992, 
230). 
7 1974. Towards equality: report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India 
http://pldindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Towards-Equality-1974-Part-1.pdf [retrieved 
27.4.2016]. 






























8 The 7th national conference of the women’s movement held in 2006 in Kolkata, for instance, 
stressed that "social constructs such as caste, class, religion, ethnicity, disability and sexuality 
create multiple identities" for many women.  
www.openspace.org.in/node/173  [retrieved 27.4.2016]. 
9 See Endnote 1. 
10 Kesavananda Bharati v. State Of Kerala And Anr, 1973, Judgment W.P.(c) 135 of 1970. 
11 National Textile Workers v. P.R. Ramkrishnan and Others, 1982, AIR 75. 
12 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Ors, AIR 1985 SC 945. 
13 Ms Jordan Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra, 1985 AIR 935. 
14 Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India, 1994 SCC, Supl. (1) 713. 
15 The Muslim Women's Act is later declared constitutional in Danial Latifi & Anr vs Union of India, 
(2001) 7 SCC. 
16 Ahmedabad Women Action Group vs Union of India, JT 1997 (3) SC 171. 
17 Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 635. 
18 Pannalal Bansilal Pitti & Ors. Etc v. State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr, 1996 SCC (2) 498. 
19 Danial Latifi & Anr v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC. 
20 John Vallamattom And Anr v. Union Of India, JT 2003 (6) SC 37. 
21 M/S Shabnam Hashmi v. Union of India & Ors on 19 February 2014. 
22 Abc v. State, on 6 July 2015. 
23 Bai Tahira A. v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia, 1979 AIR 362 and Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali & Anr., 
AIR 1980 SC 1730. 
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